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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered a wide range of issues in the area of constitutional law.
This overview first analyzes the court's activity in three important areas:
ballot access, freedom of speech, and justiciability of tort claims stemming
from operation of nuclear facilities. Finally, there is a brief review of the
court's opinions dealing with other questions of constitutional law.
I. MINOR PARTY BALLOT ACCESS: THE TENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS
STRICT SCRUTINY
In Arutunoffv. Oklahoma State Election Board' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered a constitutional challenge to those portions of
Oklahoma's election act which affect ballot access by minor parties. The
first portions challenged provided for decertification of previously recognized
political parties whose nominees for President, Vice President, or Governor
failed to receive ten percent of the votes cast.2 Decertification denied candi-
dates sponsored by decertified parties the automatic ballot access provided
to candidates affiliated with recognized parties.3 Additionally, the party af-
filiation of members of decertified parties was changed to Independent.
4
The second portion of the election act which was challenged permitted bal-
lot access to independent candidates under requirements less stringent than
those imposed on party candidates. 5
A. Oklahoma's Election Act Under Fre
In the 1980 general election, the Oklahoma Libertarian party's nomi-
nees for electors for President of the United States failed to receive the per-
centage of votes required for continued official recognition. 6 Members of the
Libertarian party brought suit to enjoin Oklahoma election officials from
decertifying the party and changing the affiliation of party members to In-
1. 687 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1892 (1983).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-109 (1981) provides: "Any recognized political party whose
nominee for Governor or nominees for electors for President and Vice President fail to receive at
least ten percent (10%) of the total votes cast for said offices in any General Election shall cease
to be a recognized political party ... "
3. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-102 (1981) provides automatic ballot position to recog-
nized political parties complying with statutorily mandated primary procedures. See Craig v.
Bard, 160 Okla. 34, 15 P.2d 1014 (1932) (interpreting predecessor to section 1-102).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-110 (1981) provides: "The secretary of each county election
board shall . . . change to Independent the party affiliation on the registration form of each
registered voter of a political party which ceases to be a recognized political party."
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-112 permits independent candidates to be listed on the ballot
either through presenting a petition signed by five percent of all registered voters or by simply
paying a filing fee.
6. The Libertarian presidential electors gained only 1.2% of the total votes cast in the
1980 general election, far short of the required 10%. 687 F.2d at 1377. See supra note 2.
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dependent. 7 The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for relief and
dismissed the action.8 The Tenth Circuit, over Judge Seymour's dissent,
upheld the district court. 9 The Supreme Court has refused to consider the
Tenth Circuit's decision.l°
B. The Arutunoff Opinion
The Arutunoff'plaintiffs claimed that Oklahoma's decertification scheme
unduly burdened their rights to freely cast their votes and to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. The independent candidate access requirements were chal-
lenged solely on equal protection grounds.I' The Arutunoff opinion does not
set forth the precise basis for plaintiffs' first and fourteenth amendment
claims. While the opinion is therefore an inadequate vehicle for analyzing
the court's treatment of these particularized claims, the dialogue between
the court and the dissent concerning the proper standard of review does pro-
vide an opportunity for a brief analysis 12 of the methodological problems
existing in this area of constitutional law.
Methodological problems stem from the fact that although the Supreme
Court has written extensively on state regulation of ballot access,' 3 no une-
quivocal standard of review has emerged from its decisions.' 4 The discussion
below limits itself to the standard of review issue in the context of the decer-
tification challenge. The challenge based on easier independent candidate
access is not addressed because the court properly held that controlling pre-
cedent permits disparate treatment for independent and party candidates. 5
C. Difring Interpretations of Supreme Court Precedent
The majority essentially viewed the Court's decisions as creating no
fixed standard of review. Rather, the Supreme Court opinions were read as
requiring the judiciary to evaluate ballot restrictions on an ad hoc/sui
generis basis.' 6 Restrictions judicially deemed "unduly oppressive" are
struck down, with lesser restrictions permitted as a proper exercise of the
7. 687 F.2d at 1377.
8. Id.
9. Arutunoffv. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1892 (1983).
10. Arutunoff v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 103 S. Ct. 1892 (1983), denying cert. to 687
F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982).
11. 687 F.2d at 1378.
12. For fuller discussion of Supreme Court cases dealing with ballot access, see Elder, Access
to the Ballot by Potitical Candidates, 83 DICK. L. REv. 387 (1979); Rada, Cardwell, Friedman,
Access to the Ballot, 13 URB. LAw. 793 (1981).
13. In chronological order the relevant cases have been: Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Illinois State Bd. of Elections
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); and Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
14. Compare Antunoff, 687 F.2d at 1379 (McWilliams, J.) (Supreme Court's decisions do not
reveal "hard-and-fast" rule or standard for measuring state ballot access laws) with Arutunoff, 687
F.2d at 1381 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court's decisions clearly mandate use of strict
scrutiny in evaluating ballot access laws imposing more than de minimus burdens).
15. See 687 F.2d at 1380 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. .724, 725 (1974)).
16. 687 F.2d at 1379.
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state's interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process. 17  This
approach emphasizes the need to examine challenged election laws to deter-
mine whether, as a practical matter, the laws operate to exclude minor party
ballot access.
Applying its test in Arutunoff, the court concluded that the Oklahoma
decertification procedures did not unduly burden ballot access. The major-
ity concluded (without reference to the record) that the requirements for
continued certification were not unreasonably high, and that decertified par-
ties could easily become recertified.' 8 The fact that ballot access was easier
under prior laws was deemed irrelevant; the court stated that the relevant
inquiry was the effect of existing law.' 9 Given the reasonableness of the bur-
dens.created by the existing laws, the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.
20
Judge Seymour, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's interpretation
of the Supreme Court's ballot access cases. Under her reading, once a minor
party established that ballot access restrictions were not de minimus a court
was required to apply strict scrutiny and strike down restrictions not reflect-
ing the least restrictive means of protecting ballot integrity.2 1  Finding
Oklahoma's certification/decertification framework to impose substantial
burdens on minor party access (albeit without citation of evidentiary sup-
port for this conclusion), Judge Seymour easily found a less restrictive
scheme in Oklahoma's previous certification procedures.2 2 Hence, the re-
quired application of strict scrutiny mandated reversal of the district court's
decision to deny plaintiffs their requested relief.
2 3
D. Sources of Methodological Confusion
The Supreme Court's first contemporary encounter with minor party
ballot access restrictions came in Wiliams v. Rhodes.24 In Williams the Court
held that two fundamental rights were implicated by state laws affecting
minor party ballot access: the right to associate for advancement of political
beliefs, and the right of a qualified voter to cast his or her ballot effectively.
2 5
Ballot access restrictions burdening these fundamental rights could only be
justified by compelling state interests.
2 6
17. Id. The state's interest in protecting the electoral process from fraud, voter confusion,
and similar antidemocratic effects provides the basis for permitting ballot access restriction. See,
e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
18. 687 F.2d at 1379-80. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-108 (1981), any non-certified
party presenting a petition signed by five percent of the voters in the immediately preceding
gubernatorial or presidential election must be certified.
19. 687 F.2d at 1380.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1380-83 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1381. Judge Seymour found further support for her contention that the new laws
were unnecessarily restrictive in the lack of evidence of ballot confusion or fraud under the prior
statutory provisions. Id. at 1382-83.
23. Id. at 1383.
24. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
25. Id. at 30-31.
26. Id. The Court did not explictly articulate a "least restrictive means" requirement in




Bullock v. Carter27 was the first case to limit Williams, doing so in two
ways. The first, explicit limitation was the recognition that not every ballot
access restriction invoked strict scrutiny; only when meaningful restriction
was present would the rigorous strict scrutiny be imposed. 28 The second,
implicit limitation is found in Bullock's delineation of strict scrutiny method-
ology. Instead of defining the judicial task as an investigation into whether
the legislative restrictions were the "least restrictive alternative," Bullock de-
fined the inquiry as an examination of whether the challenged restrictions
were "reasonably necessary" to accomplish state goals. 29 Since Bullock, the
Court has used both a "reasonably necessary" and a "least restrictive alter-
native" standard to test ballot access restrictionsa 0 A situation has therefore
been created in which a version of "middle-tier" scrutiny (legitimate state
interest combined with reasonable means) coexists with strict scrutiny (com-
pelling state interest combined with least restrictive means).
E. Resolving the Confusion by Favoring Democratic Participation
While the divergence in Supreme Court holdings may justify the Arulu-
nof majority, Aruntunoff clearly lies outside the spirit of the Court's ballot
access opinions. The thrust of the Court's decisions has been directed to-
wards reducing access requirements, with antagonism shown towards regula-
tions increasing the numerical requirements for ballot access.3 ' The Court
also recently noted the honorable and vital role minor parties have played in
the moral and political progress of the American polity.3 2 Further, ballot
access limitations impact directly on core first amendment rights of political
expression, clearly justifying judicial apprehension towards state action re-
stricting those rights.
The state in Arutunoif did not present even a modicum of proof that its
increased restrictions were necessary.33 Given that evidentiary void, the
Tenth Circuit, even if reluctant to apply strict scrutiny, should have found
Oklahoma's increased restrictions unnecessary and unduly burdensome and
reversed the lower court. Federalistic concerns may justify deference to state
legislative programs, but such deference should not override the fundamen-
tal philosophy of democratic participation embodied in the Constitution.
Absent proof that increased ballot access restrictions are in fact necessary to
27. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
28. Id. at 143.
29. Id. at 144.
30. Compare Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 (1974) (reasonable restrictions permissible);
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (restrictions valid unless "signifi-
cantly less burdensome" alternatives available) wtth Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979) (least drastic means required).
31. Cf Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974) (expressing concern over ballot access
requirement which would effectively increase petition signature requirement, especially if such
increase resulted in requirement that signatures of more than five percent of electorate be
obtained).
32. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979)
(noting important role of Abolitionist and Progressive parties).
33. Judge Seymour cogently observed that there was no evidence that Oklahoma's prior,




protect ballot integrity, 34 such increased regulations should be struck down.
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. Libel Characterizing a Statement as Fact or Fantasy Falls Wz'thin the Province
ofthe Court: Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd.
In the heavily publicized case of Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd ,"5 a
divided Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned a jury verdict
finding Penthouse magazine liable for libel.36 The Penthouse article por-
trays the thoughts and acts of a Miss Wyoming at a Miss America contest.
3 7
The article describes Miss Wyoming as performing fellatio with several male
companions, thereby causing them to levitate, with several of the acts unwit-
tingly performed during a national television broadcast. 38 In the article
Miss Wyoming also performs fellatio-like acts with her baton and thinks she
might save the world by performing similar acts with various world
leaders.
39
The court utilized a two-part test in its treatment of this defamation
action. The threshold question was whether the publication was about the
plaintiff.40 The jury specifically found that the plaintiff was the Miss Wyo-
ming about whom the article was written. 4 ' The court of appeals found that
the jury's determination was supported by the record, and accepted the
jury's conclusion that the publication was about the plaintiff.
4 2
The second element of the two-part analysis was whether the story
could reasonably be understood as describing actual facts or events about
the plaintiff or actual conduct of the plaintiff.43 Two Supreme Court opin-
ions were drawn on in articulating the "reasonably understood" require-
ment, and in holding that the fantastic nature vel non of a statement was a
question of law. In both Greenbelt Cooperative Pubhhtng Association v. Bresler 
44
34. The court stated that plaintiffs were effectively arguing that any party receiving 1.2%
of the popular vote is entitled to retain ballot position. Id. at 1380. This contention is not well-
taken. Plaintiffs did not challenge increased access requirements on the basis of their quantita-
tive showing, but rather on the qualitative nature of their showing. Essentially, plaintiffs ar-
gued that under the previous certification program they would have been treated as having
sufficient popular support to retain ballot position, and that absent a showing that the old
system violated ballot integrity increased restrictions were improper.
35. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983).
36. 695 F.2d at 440-41.
37. Id. at 441.
38. M.





44. 398 U.S. 6 (1970). In Greenbelt the plaintiff had certain property which the city wanted
to buy and other property which he wanted rezoned. Both matters were before the city council
at the same time. Various speakers at council meetings referred to the plaintiff's bargaining
position as blackmail. A newspaper article reporting on the city council proceedings referred to
those statements. After an independent review of the record, the Court held that the newspaper
article was not defamatory as a matter of law because no reader could understand the article to
mean that the plaintiff had actually been charged with blackmail. Id. at 13-14.
1984]
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and National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin,45 the Supreme Court held
that liability for defamation could not be imposed because the challenged
articles involved expressions of opinion which could not reasonably be inter-
preted as describing a real state of affairs concerning the plaintiffs. 4 6 Al-
though Greenbelt and Letter Carrters factually involved constitutional
protection for opinion, the Tenth Circuit read both cases as requiring an
appellate court to determine whether any type of statement was capable of
constituting an assertion of fact.4 7 In doing so the Tenth Circuit properly
rejected the suggestion that the factual nature of a statement was a question
for the jury. The constitutional imperative to protect freedom of expression
requires judicial characterization of a statement as ideaistic (and therefore
nonactionable) or factual (and therefore potentially actionable). 48 Thus, al-
though Pring involved fantasy and not opinion, the Tenth Circuit properly
delineated the allocation of functions between the judge and jury.
Turning to the merits, the court of appeals found the challenged por-
tions of the Penthouse article to be "impossibility and fantasy within a fanci-
ful story. ' ' 49 According to the court, it would have been impossible for a
reader not to have understood that the article was pure fantasy. 50 Because
the court considered the Penthouse article to be pure fantasy which could
not be taken to imply facts concerning the plaintiffs actual activities, it re-
versed the lower court, and held that the story could not be defamatory.
51
Judge Breitenstein's dissent argued that Penthouse should not be al-
lowed to escape liability by embellishing fact with fantasy. 52 He viewed the
article as describing factual incidents (performance of fellatio) and fanciful
events (public performance of fellatio, levitation as a result of fellatio). 53 Be-
cause the jury was able to identify the plaintiff as the subject of the article,
and because they could reasonably conclude from the article that plaintiff
had committed fellatio, an act of "sexual deviation or perversion," the dis-
sent found sufficient evidence to support a finding of libel.
54
Essentially, the two opinions debate the degree to which a potentially
ideaistic statement can be severed from its context and treated as factual,
and therefore independently actionable. In Pr'ng that debate is more aca-
demic than real. Plaintiffs amended complaint limited the libelous imputa-
45. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). In Letter Carrers a union publication referred to the plaintiffs as
"scabs" and asserted that as scabs plaintiffs were traitors to God, country, family, and class. Id.
at 268. The Court cited Greenbelt in disallowing recovery for defamation, and stated that there
was no libel because the statements concerning treason could not, as a matter of law, be taken as
suggesting plaintiffs were in fact traitors. Id. at 285-86. While the Letter Carriers holding is based
on labor law policies, the grounding of these policies in first amendment concerns, see id. at 277-
83, makes the decision relevent to first amendment analysis.
46. See supra notes 41-42.
47. 695 F.2d at 442.
48. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (first amendment oriented
primarily towards protecting expression of ideas).
49. 695 F.2d at 441.
50. Id. at 443.
51. Id. Appellate power to review lower court rulings on the ideaistic nature of a statement
is well established. See Greenbelt, 418 U.S. at 282.
52. Id. at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).




tions to either creation of the impression that plaintiff performed fellatio
while on national television, creation of the impression that plaintiff per-
formed fellatio with a named individual, or the imputation that plaintiff
performed fellatio-like acts with her baton at the Miss America pageant.
55
The dissent's emphasis that the article was libelous in imputing that Miss
Wyoming engaged in fellatio in and of itself is therefore misplaced, as plain-
tiffs did not (apparently for tactical reasons) 56 plead that libel. Given the
limited scope of the alleged libel in the context of a fanciful, ostensibly hu-
morous57 article, the majority's decision seems correct.
B. Invasion of Privacy: Application of Defamation Standards
In Rinsley v. Brandt 58 the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
entry of summary judgment against plaintiff Rinsley in his action for inva-
sion of privacy. Rinsley alleged that a book written and published by the
defendants had invaded his privacy by placing him before the public in a
false light. 5 9 The book in question, Reality Polce: The Experience of Insanity in
America, sharply criticized Dr. Rinsley's treatment of patients in mental insti-
tutions. The trial court found that the challenged portions of the book were
either true, or were opinions and therefore not actionable.
6 °
The court, in considering Rinsley's appeal, analogized false light pri-
vacy actions to defamation actions.61 Essential to both actions is a determi-
nation that the matter published is not true.62 Because a false statement is
required, truth is an absolute defense to both actions. 63 Additionally, be-
cause opinions are not assertions of fact and are therefore not actionable,
64
statements which are opinion do not create liability for invasion of privacy.
65
Rinsley first challenged the propriety of the district court making a
summary determination that certain statements in the book were true. The
Court of Appeals noted that whether a statement is true or false is a question
of fact, 66 and upheld the district court's decision regarding the truth of the
statements because Rinsley failed to raise a genuine issue of fact. 6 7 Addi-
tionally, Rinsley's own testimony confirmed the accuracy of the challenged
passages, 68 making the trial court's summary determination altogether
55. Id. at 441.
56. See id.
57. Penthouse labeled the article as a "humorous" piece. Id. at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dis-
senting). This labeling is insufficient to determine liability, however. See Bindrim v. Mitchell,
92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
58. 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 1305.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1307.
62. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment a (1977)).
63. 700 F.2d at 1307.
64. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). See also supra notes 43-48
and accompanying text.
65. 700 F.2d at 1307.
66. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 617 (1977), which states that the
truth of statement is a question for the jury in defamation actions).





In reviewing the district court's finding that particular portions of the
book were opinion, the Tenth Circuit noted that the determination as to
whether a statement is an assertion of fact or an opinion is a question of
law. 69 The court concluded that the challenged passages were not actiona-
ble'because they did not suggest any undisclosed facts that might be false,
70
but were merely exaggerated expressions of criticism.
7'
C. State Power to Limit Broadcast Advertising of Alcohol Under the Twenty-First
Amendment
In Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp72 the Tenth Circuit considered
the constitutionality of portions of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Act. The act prohibited television broadcasters and cable television op-
erators from advertising alcoholic beverages. 73 Telecasters and cable
operators filed separate suits against Crisp, the director of the Oklahoma
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, claiming that the law violated their
rights to free speech. 74 The district court granted the plaintiffs' separate mo-
tions for summary judgment, ruling that the state's power to regulate liquor
pursuant to the twenty-first amendment 75 did not override the first amend-
ment rights of the telecasters and cable operators. 76 Crisp appealed from the
summary judgments rendered by the district court; his appeals were consoli-
dated for consideration by the Tenth Circuit.
The critical issue on appeal was the precedential effect of the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the appeal in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control
Commission7 7 for want of a substantial federal question. 78 Beginning with
Hicks v. Miranda79 the Supreme Court has consistently held that summary
dispositions are decisions on the merits, and as such are binding on lower
federal courts.80 Although summary dispositions are binding, the preceden-
tial value of summary dispositions are limited. Only when the constitutional
questions presented in an earlier case's jurisdictional statement are clearly
the issues before a lower court is the lower court bound by a Supreme Court
summary disposition.
8 1
69. Id. at 1309 (citing National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-
84 (1974)).
70. 700 F.2d at 1309 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
71. 700 F.2d at 1309.
72. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.), cert. grantedsub noa. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S.
Ct. 66 (1983). A more extensive analysis of Oklahoma Telecasters appears zh_/ra in Comment, The
Substantive Fallacy of the Twenty-fist Amendment A Critique of Oklahoma Telecasters Association v.
Cr~p, 61 Den. L.J. 239 (1984).
73. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1981).
74. 699 F.2d at 492.
75. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2 provides: "The transportation or importation into any
state, territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
76. 699 F.2d at 493.
77. 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 902 (1982).
78. Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 456 U.S. 902 (1982).
79. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
80. Id. at 344-45.
81. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curium). See also Oklahoma Telecasters,
[Vol. 61:2
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The court of appeals examined the jurisdictional statement in Queensgale
and concluded that the constitutional issues presented there were substan-
tially identical to those present in Oklahoma Telecasters.82 The Tenth Circuit
characterized the plaintiffs in both cases as arguing that liquor advertising
was protected commercial speech, that the twenty-first amendment did not
ex proprio vigore allow a state to infringe on protected commercial speech,
and that a state's restrictions unconstitutionally burdened free speech
rights.8 3 Having determined that the issues presented by Queensgate were
presented by Oklahoma Telecasters, the court concluded that it was obligated
to uphold Oklahoma's regulation of liquor advertising.
84
Despite the effect of Queensgate, the court proceeded to undertake an
independent examination of the Oklahoma law. The basis for this decision
was the Supreme Court's admonition against excessive reliance on summary
dispositions, and the fact that the laws in Oklahoma Telecasters imposed more
severe restrictions than those upheld in Queensgate.8 5 The court therefore de-
cided to proceed independently, treating Queensgate as a warning against too
easily finding Oklahoma's laws unconstitutional.
86
The court began its independent examination by noting that the
Oklahoma law could be viewed either as a regulation incident to the sale of
liquor or as a means by which the state protects its people from the dangers
attending alcohol use.8 7 In either event the Oklahoma law was within the
authority granted to the states by the twenty-first amendment, and was
therefore entitled to an added presumption of validity.8 8 The court then
analyzed the Oklahoma restrictions with reference to the standards Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Pubhc Service Commission89 established for deter-
mining the validity of regulations touching commercial speech.'
Central Hudson set forth a four-pronged approach to review of commer-
cial speech regulations: 1) whether the commercial speech concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading; 2) whether the governmental interest underly-
ing regulation is substantial; 3) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest; and 4) whether the regulation is more extensive than
necessary.9 ' The court quickly disposed of the first two steps in the Central
Hudson analysis, finding that neither the sale nor use of alcohol was illegal,
that advertisements for alcoholic beverages were not inherently mislead-
ing,92 and that several substantial state interests were affected by alcohol
abuse: health and safety of citizens, highway safety, family stability, and the
699 F.2d at 496 (listing relevant Supreme Court cases). Even where a summary affirmance acts
as binding precedent a lower court is free to reject the reasoning used by the affirmed court.
Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 496. See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176-77.
82. 699 F.2d at 497.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176-77.
86. 699 F.2d at 497.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 498.
89. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
90. See 699 F.2d at 498-502.
91. 447 U.S. at 566.
92. 699 F.2d at 500.
1984]
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productivity of the work force.9 3 To these already substantial interests the
court added the state's twenty-first amendment power to regulate alcoholic
beverages.9 4 Thus, the first two prongs of the test were satisfied. 95
Regarding the third part of the Central Hudson test, the court held that
Oklahoma was not required to use the best means to advance its interest, but
was only required to choose a means directly advancing the state interest. 96
Accordingly, even though no evidence tied reducing advertising to a reduc-
tion in alcohol consumption, the court held that the advertising prohibitions
were reasonably related to reducing the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages.9 7 The court noted that the alcohol industry's advertising conduct
indicated that it was not unreasonable to recognize the consump-
tion/advertising connection;9 8 in conjunction with the deference to state ac-
tion arising by virtue of the twenty-first amendment, the advertising
restrictions plainly were a means to directly advance the state's interests.
99
Analysis of the fourth prong was more problematic. Appellees argued
that the Tenth Circuit should uphold the lower court's finding that a ban on
all rebroadcasting of alcohol-related commercials was excessive.' 00 Noting
that the point was not without difficulty, the Tenth Circuit nonetheless re-
versed the lower court. Analogizing Oklahoma's restrictions to the ban on
substantially all billboard advertising upheld in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego,'0 ' the court essentially held that no advertising business has the right
to control the use of its chosen medium.102 Given the extensive state author-
ity stemming from the twenty-first amendment, and the availability of other
mediums for acquiring alcohol-related information, Oklahoma's restrictions,
even if severe, were not excessive.' 0 3 Because Oklahoma's laws did not un-
constitutionally burden appellee's commercial speech rights, the lower court
was reversed and its injunction against enforcement of the laws dissolved. 10 4
III. MCKAY V. UNITED STATES: JUSTICIABILITY OF NUCLEAR TORTS
REVISITED
In McKay v. United Slates 105 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered the justiciability of tort claims seeking redress for property damages









101. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
102. 699 F.2d at 502.
103. Id.
104. Id. Judge McKay's brief concurring opinion added an interesting twist to the decision.
Judge McKay noted that the challenged laws were enacted by voter referendum, and replaced
a previous prohibition ordinance. Given the quid pro quo conceived by the voters (i.e. total
regulatory package for surrender of prohibition), he doubted the court's power to sever the
challenged provision from the entire regulatory regime. Id. (McKay, J., concurring).
105. 703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 103 S.Ct. 3085 (1983).
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Kay provided the Tenth Circuit with its first opportunity to apply its hold-
ing in the landmark Si/kwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 106 decision, although that
application seems questionable in light of the trial court's holding. 107
A. Background and Lower Court Opinion: Non-Justictabiit through Primary
Jursdiction
Owners of land surrounding the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant
brought suit against the United States government and the plant's operators
(federal defendants), and against several state defendants, alleging that the
plant's operation had tortiously injured plaintiffs' property. 10 8 The land-
owners' complaint asserted negligence, nuisance, liability without fault, and
an unconstitutional "taking."' 0 9 In addition to demanding attorney's fees
and twenty-six million dollars of compensatory damages plaintiffs' prayer
included a request for one-hundred-sixty million dollars in exemplary
damages. 1O
After years of pretrial activity, the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado granted the federal defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' complaint did not present justi-
ciable issues."' The basis of the trial court's finding of non-justiciability was
the pervasive federal administrative agency role in determining permissible
radiation levels from nuclear facilities in the context of the political decision
to operate a nuclear facility at Rocky Flats.' 12 This combination of factors
led the district court to hold that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction oper-
ated to preclude judicial consideration of plaintiffs' claims against the fed-
eral defendants.' 13
Plaintiffs' claims were grounded in the allegation that Rocky Flats had
created a widespread health hazard, and that this general hazard had dam-
aged their property. Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of personal injury
106. 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'din part, 52 U.S.L.W. 4043 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1984) (No.
81-2159). For fuller discussion of Silkwood, see Note, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Preemption
of State Law for Nuclear Torts?, 12 ENVTL. L. 1059 (1982); Note, Federal Preemption." State Law
Principles of Strict Liability in a Nuclear Accident--a Preemption Problem in Light of the Price-Anderson
Act?, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (1981). Comment, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Workers'
Compensation and Federal Preemption Rescue the Nuclear Tortfeasor, 60 DEN. L.J. 291 (1982).
107. See in/ta notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
108. McKay, 703 F.2d at 465.
109. Id. at 466. The takings claim was disposed of by noting that the Court of Claims had
exclusive jurisdiction over such claims when exceeding 510,000. Id. at 469-70. In upholding the
Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' contention that
these takings claims could be heard under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 470.
110. Id. at 466.
111. Good Fund Ltd.-1972 v. Church, 540 F. Supp. 519 (D. Colo. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3085 (1983). The claims
against the state defendants were not dismissed. See 703 F.2d at 548 (holding that only claims
against federal defendants are dismissed).
112. See 540 F. Supp. at 537-48.
113. Id. at 538-39. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires a court to defer to agency
factfinding where legislative intent and agency expertise dictate that an agency, not a court,
should serve as factfinder. Primary jurisdiction therefore operates to divest a court of any func-
tion except judicial review of the agency decision. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§§ 166-168 (1976).
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to any specific person. 114 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),"
15
however, had determined that the off-site radioactivity effects from Rocky
Flats had not created a general health and safety hazard.'' 6 Given EPA's
conclusion, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain tort claims
grounded in allegations relating to creation of a general health hazard.
1 17
Any finding contrary to that of the EPA would usurp the agency's factual
conclusion, based on its statutory jurisdiction, that Rocky Flats' operation
had not created a general health hazard.'i Deference to agency jurisdiction
therefore precluded any judicial action except consideration of the arbitrari-
ness of the EPA's findings concerning Rocky Flats' generalized health
effects. 119
Buttressing the reasons for finding primary jurisdiction were the na-
tional defense aspects of Rocky Flats. The trial court noted that the decision
to operate Rocky Flats was reviewed annually, 120 and that the judiciary has
traditionally recognized that questions concerning national defense (includ-
ing its nuclear component) are usually left to the other branches of govern-
ment.12 ' Given the political nature of the Rocky Flats operation, and the
existence of an agency having statutory jurisdiction over the health and
safety issues involved in the lawsuit, and a special competence in resolving
those issues, a proper respect for the judiciary's constitutional role required
recognition of, and deference to, EPA's primary jurisdiction.
122
B. The Appellate Opinion: Justcta.6hihy Through Non-Preemption
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not frame the issues in terms of pri-
mary jurisdiction, instead analyzing the trial court's opinion as a finding
that state tort remedies had been preempted through either pervasive regu-
lation or the presence of a political question.' 23 Seizing on the distinction
the lower court had drawn between claims of individualized personal injury
and the claims presented concerning property damage, 24 the Tenth Circuit
pointed out that if preemption existed for property injuries it would also
exist for personal injuries.' 25 The court, on the basis of its Silkwood decision,
114. 540 F. Supp. at 545.
115. Id.
116. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had jurisdiction to determine the health
and safety effects of Rocky, Flats' radioactive releases. Id. at 537.
117. Id. at 538. Plaintiffs argued that the EPA's findings were not final, were the result of a
collusive attempt by government agencies to insulate themselves from liability, were not final
agency action, and were improperly promulgated, with the result that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not mandate deference to the findings. Id. at 540-43. The trial court rejected
these contentions, finding them insufficient to justify assuming jurisdiction. Id. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, because it did not analyze the trial court's primary jurisdiction conclusions, see infra notes
123-132 and accompanying text, did not consider these arguments.
118. 540 F. Supp. at 538-39.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 545.
121. Id. at 547.
122. Id.
123. McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3085
(1983).
124. 703 F.2d at 466-67.
125. Id.
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then simply rejected the viability of a preemption analysis with respect to
state tort claims requesting compensatory damages.
126
Having rejected preemption as a basis for denying plaintiffs their re-
quested relief the court of appeals turned to what it perceived to be the
alternate ground for the trial court's decision, which was the presence of a
political question. 2 7 The political question doctrine is rooted in separation
of powers principles,128 and seeks to avoid judicial usurpation of political
branch prerogatives by refraining from judicial decisionmaking on questions
constitutionally reserved for the political branches. 129 The Tenth Circuit,
while recognizing that certain aspects of the Rocky Flats operation had
political overtones (e.g. the decision to operate the plant), 30 rejected the
proposition that deciding to provide civil remedies to plaintiffs injured by




The circuit court's opinion, while probably correct in terms of existing
precedent, does not satisfactorily address the lower court's opinion. The dis-
trict court did not base its holding on a straight-forward preemption theory,
recognizing that Stikwood precluded such an approach.133 Instead, the court
examined whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction precluded considera-
tion of tort claims based on the generalized health and safety effects of
Rocky Flats, explicitly recognizing that with respect to issues not falling
within the EPA's jurisdiction (e.g. the effect of Rocky Flats on a single indi-
vidual), 134 primary jurisdiction was inapplicable. Further, the lower court
did not use the political question doctrine as an alternate basis for its rejec-
tion of plaintiffs' claims. The political nature of atomic weapons production
was merely an additional justification for finding that executive agencies had
primary jurisdiction to investigate the effects of governmental conduct in the
production of such weapons. 135 Had the the lower court opinion been ad-
126. Id. Silkwood held that compensatory tort actions were not preempted by federal regula-
tion. 667 F.2d at 922. This aspect of Silkwood was not affected by the Supreme Court's review
of the case.
127. 703 F.2d at 467-69.
128. Id. at 470.
129. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
130. 703 F.2d at 470.
131. Id. at 471-72. Applying the test enunciated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the
court noted the lack of a textual commitment of this issue to a political branch, the availability
of manageable judicial standards for resolving these claims, and the general propriety ofjudicial
action in the circumstances presented by this litigation. 703 F.2d at 471. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 217.
132. 703 F.2d at 472.
133. 540 F. Supp. at 532.
134. Id. at 545.
135. The lower court's "political question" analysis states:
The plaintiffs' contentions are that the manner in which these authorized operations
have been conducted has caused the deposition of transuranium elements on their
lands which then have become unusable because of claimed resultant health hazards.
It is my considered view that the determination of the existence of such hazards and
the acceptability of them are also political decisions for the Congress and the Presi-
dent. They have placed responszbifiy for the collection and evaluation of the relevant data in the
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dressed on its own terms, McKay might easily have reached a different result.
IV. CASE DIGESTS
A. Speech Restrtctions Created by Drug Paraphernah'a Laws
In three separate cases the court of appeals considered the constitution-
ality of drug paraphernalia laws. 136 Each statute or ordinance was attacked
as being vague and overbroad, and as permitting prosecution on the basis of
a third person's intent. 137 For the most part the court found its decision in
Hejira Corp. v. MacFarland'13 to be dispositive of these challenges, holding
that the intent element of the statute cured any vagueness problems.1 39 Ad-
ditional challenges, however, involving suppression of speech effects from the
regulations, raised new issues in the Tenth Circuit.
The speech challenges fell into two categories: non-commercial and
commercial. The non-commercial challenges centered around the statutory
criteria for discerning the presence of drug paraphernalia. These criteria
provided that the content of descriptive materials accompanying an object
could be used to define its paraphernalia status. 140 The court rejected this
challenge, holding that the first amendment impact, if any, was merely inci-
dental to regulation of nonspeech conduct (presumably sale of the accompa-
nying paraphernalia object) associated with the protected speech.' 4 '
Because the regulations were narrowly drawn to regulate nonspeech con-
duct, their incidental impact on protected speech was constitutionally
permissible. 142
The commercial speech objections arose from statutory provisions
criminalizing advertising of drug paraphernalia by a person with actual or
constructive knowledge that the advertised items constituted parapherna-
lia. 143 The trial courts ruled that the bans, which barred advertising over
wide geographical areas,' 44 were more extensive than required by the state
interest at hand and therefore unconstitutional.' 45 The Tenth Circuit re-
designated agencies and in the absence of a showing that there has been a violation of the agency
standards, this court has no power to intervene. Accordingly, all of the plaintiffs' claims
against the United States, Dow, and Rockwell must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Id. at 548 (emphasis supplied).
136. General Stores, Inc. v. Bingaman, 695 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1982) (challenging N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-31-2 (1978)); Kansas Retail Trade Cooperative v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343
(10th Cir. 1982) (pre-effective date challenge to H.B. 2020); Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F.2d 1348
(10th Cir. 1982) (challenging Clovis, N.M. Ordinance No. 1150-80 (July 24, 1980)).
137. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 503; Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1345-46; Weller, 695 F.2d at
1349.
138. 660 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981).
139. E.g., Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1343 ("a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vague-
ness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is
proscribed") (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 499 (1982)).
140. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 503; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
141. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 504-05; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
142. General Stores, Inc., 695 F.2d at 505; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
143. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1345; Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
144. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1345 (statewide); Weler, 695 F.2d at 1350 (no geographic limit).
145. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1347; Weler, 695 F.2d at 1350. Cf. Central Hudson Gas & Electric
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jected these rulings,146 apparently on the ground that the advertising pro-
posed an illegal transaction, and was thereforeF not protected by the first
amendment. 1
47
The only defect in any of the laws was in the Clovis, New Mexico city
ordinance, which provided for forfeiture of paraphernalia without a hear-
ing.' 48 The court said that a hearing in connection with the forfeiture was
required, but that a post-forfeiture hearing would suffice.
14 9
B. Constitutionalt'ty of Bankruptcy Court Filing Fees
In Otasco, Inc. v. United States (In re South)1 50 debtors of Otasco filed for
bankruptcy, naming Otasco as a creditor. Otasco filed pleadings objecting
to having the debts discharged, and was required to pay a filing fee in con-
nection with these pleadings.' 5 ' Instead of paying the fee, Otasco filed a
motion claiming that the filing fee was an unconstitutional burden on its
right to protect its property from governmental action.' 52 The bankruptcy
court agreed, and ruled that the fee requirement was unconstitutional as
violative of due process.' 53 The district court affirmed.'
54
Otasco argued that creditors of bankrupts are placed in a position
where they must defend their property rights and that the imposition of a
filing fee to defend those rights unconstitutionally burdens their access to the
courts. 155 Otasco relied primarily on its interpretation of Boddie v. Connecti-
Cut156 and read that decision to declare filing fees unconstitutional when
they operated to preclude access to the courts for the litigation of fundamen-
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (restrictions on commercial speech
cannot be more extensive than necessary).
146. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1347-48; Weier, 695 F.2d at 1350. The court's comments in Ste-
phan appear to be dicta, as neither party appealed the trial court's ruling on the advertising
ban. 695 F.2d at 1347-48.
147. The exact basis for the Tenth Circuit's rulings is unclear. The district court's decision
in Stephan had two bases, first that the ban was geographically overbroad, and second that the
ban reached non-paraphernalia advertisers. Stephan, 695 F.2d at 1347. The Tenth Circuit
properly rejected the second, or categorical, overbreadth rationale. See Hoffman Estates v. Flip-
side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982) (overbreadth doctrine inapplicable to
commercial speech). The geographical overbreadth argument, which is grounded in the re-
quirement that commercial speech regulation be no broader than necessary, was not addressed
in Stephan. See 695 F.2d at 1347-48.
In Weter, the court relied on its ruling in Stephan and the Supreme Court's Flipside ruling in
reversing the trial court. See 695 F.2d at 1350. Because neither Stephan nor Flpstde address the
problem of overextensive restrictions of commercial speech, Wetter is necessarily grounded in a
finding that the proposed speech is unconstitutional because proposing an illegal transaction.
Cf. Fhipside, 455 U.S. at 496 (government can ban speech proposing illegal transaction). Simi-
larly, Stephan appears grounded in Fzpstd-'s recognition that speech proposing illegal transac-
tions can be banned in its entirety.
148. Weiler, 695 F.2d at 1350.
149. Id. at 1351.
150. 689 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983).
151. 689 F.2d at 164.
152. Id. at 164.
153. 6 Bankr. 645 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980), a'd, 10 Bankr. 889 (W.D. Okla. 1981), rev'd,
689 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983).
154. 10 Bankr. 889 (W.D. Okla. 1981),rev'd, 689 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1982),cert. dented, 103 S.
Ct. 1522 (1983).
155. 689 F.2d at 164.
156. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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tal rights. 157
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that Boddie did not hold
that access to the judicial system can never be burdened, but instead insti-
tuted a balancing test.158 When access to court is burdened, the interest the
individual is seeking to protect in court is balanced against the governmental
interest in imposing the restriction. 159 Otasco was seeking to protect its con-
tractual rights, none of which touched fundamental interests. 160 Against
Otasco's interests were balanced the governmental interest in recouping the
costs of the bankruptcy system and in discouraging creditors from harassing
debtors rather than genuinely contesting discharge. 16 ' In light of the
nonfundamental nature of Otasco's interest, the legitimate governmental in-
terests in exacting the fee, and Otasco's ability to pay, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the filing fee did not unconstitutionally burden access to the
courts. 162
C. Residency Requirements
Smith v. Paulk 163 considered the constitutionality of an Oklahoma stat-
ute which required applicants for employment agency licenses to have been
Oklahoma residents for one year. 164 After being denied a license solely be-
cause of his failure to meet the residency requirement,' 65 Smith filed suit
against the Oklahoma Commissioner of Labor alleging that the residency
requirement violated Smith's rights under the privileges and immunities,
equal protection, and due process clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion. 166 The district court held that the Oklahoma law violated the privi-
leges and immunities clauses of article IV and the fourteenth amendment by
restricting the right to travel. 167
The court of appeals noted that it was a corporate application which
had been denied, and that corporations do not have the benefit of the privi-
leges and immunities clause or the fourteenth amendment. 68 Despite these
facts, the court ruled that because Smith intended to relocate to manage the
corporation, personal rights to migrate were restricted by the statute, render-
ing Smith's claims justiciable. 1
69
The Tenth Circuit applied Supreme Court case law holding that legis-
lation which restricts the right of interstate migration must be justified by
157. 689 F.2d at 164.
158. Id. at 165.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 165-66.
162. Id. at 166.
163. 705 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1983).
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 53(b) (1981).
165. 705 F.2d at 1281.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1283. To support the proposition that a corporation does not have the benefit of
the privileges and immunities clauses the court cited Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Stan-
dard Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207,
210-11 (1945), and Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-50 (1928).
169. 705 F.2d at 1284.
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compelling state interests and must be narrowly tailored to achieve those
interests. 17° The court stated that a less lengthy residency requirement
would adequately serve the state interest of investigating applicants to en-
sure that employment agencies operated in the public interest. 1 7 ' Hence,
although the residency requirement was itself a proper legislative measure,
the existence of an alternative less restrictive than the one-year requirement
rendered the Oklahoma statute unconstitutional.
17 2
D. Associational Standing to Challenge Third Party Subpoena
In Grandbouche v. United States 173 the Tenth Circuit considered the issue
of standing to protect the first amendment right of association from govern-
mental invasion through subpoena. A grand jury subpoena served on the
First National Bank of Englewood, Colorado ordered production of all
records pertaining to the accounts of two groups advocating noncompliance
with the federal tax system. 174 The two groups and individual members of
one of the groups brought suit asking that the subpoena be quashed on the
grounds that enforcement of the subpoena would violate first amendment
rights of association. 175 The district court ruled that the petitioners lacked
standing to raise the first amendment claims because the subpoena was di-
rected to a third party.
176
The court of appeals reversed the district court and remanded the case
for a hearing to consider whether the petitioner's first amendment rights
would actually be violated by enforcing the subpoena. 17 7 First amendment
guarantees were distinguished from fourth and fifth amendment rights,
which cannot be infringed unless the governmental action is directed at the
holder of the right. 178 The court observed that the right to associate freely
will be chilled equally whether associational information is compelled from
an organization itself or from third parties. 179 Accordingly, an organization
and its members have standing to protect their first amendment rights of
association which are infringed by governmental information gathering ac-




171. Id. at 1285.
172. Id.
173. 701 F,2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983).
174. The groups were the National Commodity & Barter Association (NCBA) and the Na-
tional Unconstitutional Tax Strike Committee (NUTS). Id. at 116.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 118-19.
178. Id. at 117.
179. Id. at 118.
180. Id.
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